Why does military coercion failed

It thus narrows the gap between theory and practice, offering actionable guidance to decisionmakers seeking to achieve US foreign policy objectives without the violence and destruction caused by war.

Some of its lessons affirm conventional wisdom, others are decidedly counterintuitive and stand in contrast to current US policy. The Stimson office is closed to all visitors. All public events are now online. Staff remain available via email, phone, and video conference.

During this time, the Stimson Center will continue its important work, informing policymakers and the public — here, on social media, and via email. Skip to content Research. US Foreign Policy. Project Note. Despite its status as sole superpower after the Cold War, US efforts to coerce other states failed as often as they succeeded.

May 13, pm. This may be because unclear demands increase the likelihood of misinterpretation, confusion, and therefore of inadvertent defiance; or because they suggest the US policy position is not firm but rather fluid, potentially moveable under the pressure of intentional defiance.

From this contrast, there emerge two general conclusions: The following section deals with Pape and his angular contribution to the study of military coercion.

I discuss 'Bombing to Win' on its own terms, drawing out its principal elements and results. I close with a brief review of the state of the literature that examines and criticizes the work. The next section partially reconstructs Clausewitz' theory for the purposes of this article. I am particularly interested in the understanding of what essentially constitutes war, as well as what forms it can assume in reality. I close with some general considerations and present the results of the confrontation between Pape and Clausewitz and their implications for the study of military coercion.

The conception of the use of force as a bargaining chip and the breakdown of this conception into two types, corresponding to concretely distinct situations in the relationship between the use of force and the type of desired influence on the behavior of an adversary, are usually attributed to Thomas Schelling SCHELLING, ; Schelling's distinction , comes about due to the existence of situations in which the desired outcome is the avoidance of a certain type of behavior on the part of an adversary, and other situations in which the goal is to force the adversary to desist from a certain position or course of action on which it has already embarked.

New Haven: Yale University Press. Deterrence has undetermined validity and implies that the initiative lies with one's opponent, whose behavior one seeks to influence. Compellence implies initiating an action that is conditioned on a specific behavior that it is hoped will be produced in the opponent.

Time ceases to be undetermined and a deadline is put in place for the opponent to change its behavior. The extensive literature produced since the s deals exclusively with the dynamics, possibilities, and limits of the most active and positive coercive uses of force, in such a way as to render the terms coercion and compellence interchangeable. It is in this strict sense that military coercion is broadly understood today and addressed in this article. In the process of rebirth of the study of military coercion, no-one has had a greater influence on the creation and direction of debate than North American political scientist Robert Pape, for which reason his contributions will henceforth be analyzed in detail as exemplars of the arguments that I intend to confront.

After the publication of some articles dedicated to the theory and practice of military coercion 1 1 For the author's discussion on the conditions and the limits of economic coercion, see Pape a. Journal of Strategic Studies. For the purposes of his study, Pape defines coercion as "efforts to change the behavior of a state by manipulating costs and benefits" PAPE, , p.

The purpose of such coercion is to alter an opponent's posture, forcing it to change its behavior, instead of discouraging it from undertaking an action not yet begun. Schelling used the term 'diplomacy of violence' to describe the use of the ability to cause harm as a bargaining tool to influence behaviors and produce favorable results SCHELLING, , pp.

New York: St. Political Science Quarterly. The difference between brute force and coercion, insofar as the author is concerned, is made clear in the following passage:. There is a difference between taking what you want and making someone give it to you, between fending off assault and making someone afraid to assault you, between holding what people are trying to take and making them afraid to take it, between losing what someone can forcibly take and giving it up to avoid risk or damage SCHELLING, SCHELLING, Thomas C.

To coerce means to convince an adversary that it is better to consent than to suffer the potential consequences of resistance.

In Pape's words, "coercion seeks to change the behavior of states that still retain the capacity for organized military resistance" PAPE, , p.

This essential demarcation has been present in Pape's argument since his first publication on the subject, in , as can be seen in the text: "Unlike ordinary military action, which seeks to rout opposing forces on the battlefield and then impose political demands on a defenseless victim, coercion seeks to change the behavior of the victim without decisive military victory PAPE, , p PAPE, Robert A. It so happens that the proposed distinction between coercion and conducting war has significant implications from the theoretical and methodological points of view.

Theoretically, coercion and war are essentially distinct things, each with its own logic. Undertaking war implies using means of force with the goal of completely obliterating any possibility of opposition from an opponent. It signifies, in other words, leaving an opponent with no choice other than to accept the demands imposed on it.

Affecting the opponent's 'calculus', by presenting a binary choice between suffering and doing what is demanded of it as a way of extracting a concession — this belongs well and truly to the field of coercion 3 3 Pape recognizes that the distinction between coercion and waging war can be difficult, considering the possibilities of overlapping intentions and instruments.

Nonetheless, Pape believes that cases of pure coercion do exist, such as when the use of force is merely threatened, as do cases of waging war, such as in the case of operations that depend on absolute surprise.

Methodologically, the distinction between coercion and war conditions perceptions of what constitutes coercive success or failure. The parameters of coercive success are relatively straightforward: if an opponent is confronted with the possibility of choosing between resisting and then giving in, or simply giving in, and if its calculations have been influenced by the actual or potential use of force, then military coercion can be said to have worked.

In other words, that the potential risk of future consequences was sufficient to produce the desired result. On the other hand, the conception of coercive failure, in Pape's terms , allows for a range of scenarios. If an opponent, even while under pressure and being threatened militarily, does not give in to the demands imposed on it, the result is an unequivocal coercive failure. However, the granting of demands made of a defeated and prostrate opponent equally characterizes a coercive failure; the conclusion in such cases is that bargaining has been given up in favor of brute force.

Coercion fails when the coercer stops its coercive military actions prior to concessions by the target, when the coercer's attacks continue but do not produce compliance by the target, or when the coercer imposes its demands only after complete defeat of the target.

The last is crucial: if a coercive attempt is made but the war ends only when one side is decisively defeated, then coercion has failed, even if the coercer wins the war PAPE, PAPE, Robert A. In other words, the current debate concerns empirical contrasting and testing of the models or 'theories of military coercion'. In effect, the purpose of Pape's work is "to present a theory that explains the success and failure of military coercion and to test it against the outcomes of all the strategic air offensives employed in international disputes during the twentieth century" PAPE, , p.

For criticism of the utility of these models, see Lebow and Stein , Watts and Walt Naturally, R is positive where the product of the benefits by its probability is greater than the product of the costs expected by its probability. The function of coercion is to modify the original cost-benefit ratio, through influence on one or more of the four variables on the right side of the equation. The benefits B , to begin with, are not easily modified.

The value of control over a territory and its population, to cite one of the commonest elements in international disputes, is rarely susceptible to change, except in the event of dramatic actions such as the devastation of such a territory by a nuclear attack.

What remains as a potential target of a coercive action, then, is the probability of the benefits being obtained p[B] and the expected costs multiplied by their probability C p[C]. The focus 'par excellence' insofar as punishment is concerned, according to Pape, is the society of the target state, which may be affected directly or indirectly: "Punishment campaigns seek to raise the societal costs of continued resistance to levels that overwhelm the target state's territorial interests, causing it to concede to the coercer's demands" PAPE, , p.

No relationship is necessary between the targets of the attack and the object of the dispute. The important thing is to strike against something that the adversary holds in high esteem and whose loss or deterioration would be less acceptable than the concession being demanded. The integrity of the population and its means of subsistence is regarded as the good most valuable to a State, which makes it a natural target for the manipulation of its cost-benefit calculus.

Punitive campaigns are associated with attacks on residential and economic areas across a concentrated time scale to maximize shock, and the involvement of a mixture of explosive and incendiary bombs, with a large proportion of the latter. The important thing is not the obliteration of specific targets, but the degree of devastation caused by the action, in order that that the ensuing 'psychological impact' may be maximized.

Where economic and infrastructure objectives are targeted, these should be related to the basic needs of the population, such as energy supply and food distribution 5 5 Giulio Douhet is the air war theorist generally regarded as the father of systematic thought on the potential of aerial punishment.

The two central hypotheses permeating his ideas were that: Air raids were to become, for Douhet, the decisive weapon of war and 'strategic bombardments', or indiscriminate air attacks on key enemy urban and economic centers, the indispensable doctrine if any victory is to be achieved in future wars.

For a distinction between so-called strategic air raids and tactical ones, see Knight For the most recent doctrinal defense of strategic bombing as an efficacious, autonomous and cheap method for achieving significant political changes, see Warden III Costs are not imposed with all available energy, but in a gradual way that suggests that more is to come if matters do not progress as desired: "the key is to inflict civilian costs at a gradually increasing rate rather than destroy the entire target set in one fell swoop" PAPE, PAPE, Robert A.

Instead of an unrestricted punitive attack on civilians, the word that sums up the application of risk is 'gradualism'. Actions are developed along a growing scale of intensity, in such a way that this may be appreciated by an adversary, to induce it to make calculations in terms of what it 'may still avoid'. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. This is, however, an impropriety on Pape's part The 'risk manipulation' that Schelling refers to , pp.

Such situations constitute a test of nerve, and are won by the party that manages to face off its opponent and maintain its position when faced with an increasing possibility of disaster 6 6 In game theory jargon, it is a game of chicken.

See Dixit and Skeath A common metaphor is that of a small boat being rocked and taking on a rhythm of its own, 'independent' of the crew that had started rocking the boat to see who would give up first out of fear of drowning. Indeed, it is difficult not to think that the United States soon will need to determine whether its deterrent objectives in Europe are met best by a larger permanent presence, by NATO interoperability, by so-called dynamic force employment, or by something else entirely.

As much as Russia has demonstrated that luck is when preparation meets opportunity, China has demonstrated an extent of strategic patience and a degree of operational creativity that pose new and paradigm-breaking challenges for the United States. Taken together, this collection of detailed work not only adds historical depth and richness to important coercive events but also brings to the fore important lessons about coercive strategy. Each study notes instances in which US communication of the behaviors desired of the targeted actor was ambiguous or bombastic — and, occasionally, both — characteristics that common sense suggests militate against accurate interpretation of demands, much less behavioral compliance.

Each study identifies contextual characteristics — alliances, economic relationships, power dynamics — that might affect the outcome of any immediate coercive exchange. And each study emphasizes that coercion requires the careful coordination of multiple tools of influence; military power alone was in no case adequate to achieve US policy objectives short of war.

The outcome of this study is not a new theory of coercion, a typology associating leadership psychology with coercibility, a guide to enhancing national resolve, or a protocol of hard and fast rules that, if only followed, will guarantee coercive success.

Each chapter, however, does produce stand-alone lessons; and these, when drawn together as a collective set in the concluding chapter, offer guidance about the construction of effective coercive strategy. The need for such strategies is again acute, as the United States faces a less pliable and increasingly contested international environment. It is unrealistic to believe that the world soon will be populated only by states satisfied with the status quo, and it would be irresponsible for US leaders to behave as though possessing the most able war-fighting force in the world will suffice to address the full spectrum of interstate frictions and conflicts.

The United States must be prepared to manage provocation, incrementalism, and defiance. This imperative sits alongside the ever-present specter of interstate war. Navigating the line between the two will require US decisionmakers to take great care in the design of policies that include use of the US armed forces, and to practice great discipline in their implementation. The consequences of failure on either count may be severe. In this case, we see brilliance built on brilliance as the seminal work, Force Without War , is brought up to the present by a trenchant team of scholars and practitioners.

It is not only a masterful updating of a classic study, but a thorough and wide-ranging assessment of the relevance — real and perceived — of American military power in a world where interests, adversaries, and conflicts interact in more complicated ways than ever. It combines statistical analysis with detailed case studies, written by noted experts, to show where and how military coercion can help achieve US national objectives without resorting to large-scale military operations.

In other words, this book provides the kind of analytical and falsifiable research that characterizes the best of modern social science — but with the savvy and practicality of Washington insiders who understand how US foreign policy is actually made. For example, sending one aircraft carrier to a crisis turns out to be about as effective as sending several. And deploying US forces shoulder-to-shoulder with strong allied participation makes a significant positive difference as well.

The findings provide extremely helpful grist for policymakers deciding when and if to send US military forces to deter or compel American adversaries. The Stimson office is closed to all visitors. All public events are now online.

Staff remain available via email, phone, and video conference. During this time, the Stimson Center will continue its important work, informing policymakers and the public — here, on social media, and via email. Skip to content Research. US Foreign Policy. Examining the use of the U. June 15, Book Flyer. On this page. Share on twitter. Share on facebook. Share on linkedin. Share on email. Print Page.

Chapters Ch. Blechman Ch. Pollack Ch. Durch Ch. Chase Ch. Facebook Twitter Youtube Linkedin. Stay Informed by Email. Media Inquiries. Caiti Goodman Copyright The Henry L. Stimson Center Privacy Policy. This book considers why with its tremendous military advantage the United States so often fails to coerce much weaker states.

The answer frequently resides in the large asymmetry in power which provides the United States a high probability of victory in a brute force war. The resultant high expected outcome from war introduces an incentive to leverage coercive demands upon a weak adversary, concession to which threaten the survival of the state, its regime, or its regime leadership.

Perceiving its survival at stake an opponent will resist, so long as it has the means to do so. Theoretically, t Theoretically, to avoid signaling costs, a powerful challenger should only choose coercive strategies likely to succeed.

In practice, however, as in Iraq in and , U. Coercion may also fail when interests are so limited that the United States cannot continue to make its threats credible as in following the El Dorado air raid against Libya.